Introduction to Cryptology ENEE459E/CMSC498R: Homework 12

Due by 2pm on 5/14/2015.

1. Consider the following variant of El Gamal encryption. The private key is (G, g, q, x) and the public key is $G, g, q, h)$, where $h = g^x$ and $x \in Z_q$ is chosen uniformly. To encrypt a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, in the message space $\mathcal{M}$, choose a uniform $r \in Z_q$, compute $c_1 := g^r mod p$ and $c_2 := h^r \cdot g^m$, and let the ciphertext be $\langle c_1, c_2 \rangle$. For which message spaces $\mathcal{M}$ will the above scheme be a good encryption scheme?

2. Consider the following variant of El Gamal encryption. Let $p = 2q + 1$, let G be the group of squares modulo p, and let g be a generator of G. The private key is (G, g, q, x) and the public key is $G, g, q, h)$, where $h = g^x$ and $x \in Z_q$ is chosen uniformly. To encrypt a message $m \in Z_q$, choose a uniform $r \in Z_q$, compute $c_1 := g^r mod p$ and $c_2 := h^r + m mod p$, and let the ciphertext be $\langle c_1, c_2 \rangle$. Is this scheme CPA-secure? Prove your answer.

3. Consider the following modified version of padded RSA encryption: Assume messages to be encrypted have length exactly $||N||/2$. To encrypt, first compute $\hat{m} := 0x00||r||0x00||m$ where r is a uniform string of length $||N||/2 - 16$. Then compute the ciphertext $c := [\hat{m}^e mod N]$. When decrypting a ciphertext c, the receiver computes $\hat{m} := [c^d mod N]$ and returns an error of $\hat{m}$ does not consist of $0x00$ followed by $||N||/2 - 16$ arbitrary bits followed by $0x00$. Show that this scheme is not CCA-secure. Why is it easier to construct a chosen-ciphertext attack on this scheme than on PKCS 1 v1.5?

4. In Section 12.4.1 we showed an attack on the plain RSA signature scheme in which an attacker forges a signature on an arbitrary message using two signing queries. Show how an attacker can forge a signature on an arbitrary message using a single signing query.