Introduction to Cryptology

Lecture 16

Announcements

- HW6 due today
- HW7 posted on course webpage, due Thursday 4/7
- EC opportunity
  - Due on Thursday, May 5
  - Maximum of 2 people signed up per paper

Agenda

- Last time
  - Started practical constructions of Block Ciphers (6.2)

- This time
  - SPN

Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN)

In practice, round-functions are not random permutations, since it would be difficult to implement this in practice.

- Why?

Instead, round functions have a specific form:

- Rather than having a portion of the key k specify an arbitrary permutation f, we instead fix a public "substitution function" (i.e. permutation) S, called an S-box.
- Let k define the function f given by $f(x) = S(k \oplus x)$.

Informal Description of SPN

1. Key mixing: Set $x := x \oplus k$, where k is the current-round sub-key.
2. Substitution: Set $x := S_1(x_1)|| \cdots ||S_8(x_8)$, where x_i is the i-th byte of x.
3. Permutation: Permute the bits of x to obtain the output of the round.
4. Final mixing step: After the last round there is a final key-mixing step. The result is the output of the cipher.
   - Why is this needed?
- Different sub-keys (round keys) are used in each round.
   - Master key is used to derive round sub-keys according to a key schedule.

Formal description of SPN

FIGURE 6.2: A substitution-permutation network.

SPN is a permutation

Proposition: Let F be a keyed function defined by an SPN in which the S-boxes are all permutations. Then regardless of the key schedule and the number of rounds, F_k is a permutation for any k.

How many rounds needed for security?

The avalanche effect.

Random permutation: When a single input bit is changed to go from x to x', each bit of $f(x)$ should be flipped with probability ½ .

- S-boxes are designed so that changing a single bit of the input to an S-box changes at least two bits in the output of the S-box.

- The mixing permutations are designed so that the output bits of any given S-box are used as input to multiple S-boxes in the next round.

The Avalanche Effect

$f(x)$ vs. $f(x')$ where x, x' differ in one bit:

1. After the first round the intermediate values differ in exactly two bit-positions. Why?
2. The mixing permutation spreads these two bit positions into two different S-boxes in the second round.
   - At the end of the second round, intermediate values differ in 4 bits.
3. Continuing the same argument, we expect 8 bits of the intermediate value to be affected after the 3rd round, 16 after the 4th round, and all 128 bits of the output to be affected at the end of the 7th round.

Practical SPN

- Usually use many more than 7 rounds.
- S-boxes are NOT random permutations.

Attacking Reduced-Round SPN

Trivial case: Attacking one round SPN with no final key-mixing step.

Attacking Reduced-Round SPN

One-round SPN: 64-bit block length. S-boxes with 8-bit input.
Independent, 64-bit subkeys.

First attempt at attack:
- Given an input/output pair (x, y)
- Enumerate over all possible values for the second-round subkey k_2.
- For each such value, invert the final key-mixing step to get a candidate output y'
- Given (x, y') first-round subkey k_1 is determined.
- Use additional input-output pairs to determine the correct $(k_1 || k_2)$ pair.

How long does this attack take?

Attacking Reduced-Round SPN

One-round SPN: 64-bit block length. S-boxes with 8-bit input. Independent, 64-bit subkeys.

Improved attack—work byte-by-byte:
- Given an input/output pair (x, y)
- Enumerate over all possible values for the 8 bit positions corresponding to the output of the first S-box for the second-round subkey k_2.
- For each such value, invert the final key-mixing step to get a candidate 8-bit output y'
- Given (x, y') the first 8-bits of the first-round subkey k_1 are determined.
- Construct a table of 2^8 possible key values for each block of 8-bits of k_1, k_2.
- Use additional input-output pairs to determine the correct 8-bits of k_1 and first byte of k_2.

How long does this attack take? $8 \cdot 2^8 = 2^{11}$.

Can be improved: Use additional input/output pairs. Incorrect pair $(k_1 || k_2)$ will work on two pairs with probability 2^{-8}. Can use small number of input/output pairs to narrow down all tables to a single value each at which point the entire master key is known. In expectation, a single additional pair will reduce each table to a single consistent key value.

Lessons Learned

It should not be possible to work independently on different parts of the key.

More diffusion is required. More rounds are necessary to achieve this.

Feistel Networks
An alternative approach to Block Cipher Design